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Abstract: This chapter identifies and explains several primary functions of the fictional use of 
metalinguistic devices and considers some difficult cases. In particular, this chapter argues that 
when real persons are quoted in a storyworld they are ‘storified’ as near-real fictions. In cases of 
the misquotation of real persons, near-real fictions and near-real quotations must adequately 
exploit resemblances between the real and the fictional. This concludes with a discussion of the 
similarities between fictional and nonfictional uses of metalinguistic acts, and how they bear on 
our understanding of imagination and make-believe.  
 






Metalinguistic acts are the use of language to report something.1 Speech occurs in an initial 
context, c1. It is reported on in some other context, c2. This is done for a number of reasons: to 
translate speech, to describe or imitate the speech of others, to provide evidence for a separate 
assertion, to establish authority, to chronicle events, etc. When used to chronicle events, speech 
reporting is not the only option. Rather than talk about an event in c1, a speaker tells a listener 
about some language that was used in c1. When this happens, the speaker tells the listener 
something about c1 using a speech report. We don’t know a priori what that something is.2 For 
some reason, the speaker has decided to use a metalinguistic act in order to tell that something. 
Why does this matter? Suppose what happened in c1 is that Jon killed a reindeer. In recalling this 
event, Lisa could say, “Jon killed a reindeer and was overjoyed at his good luck,” or she could 
say, “Jon killed a reindeer and hollered, ‘this is my lucky day!’” Lisa is telling the story of Jon’s 
luck and doing it with a description of his feelings, in the first case, or with a quotation of his 
speech, in the second. The quotation of his speech is doing the work of describing his feelings 
for the listener. It does not have to be this way. Lisa could be quoting Jon for different reasons 
(perhaps she is gathering evidence of how he cheats the other hunters). She might love the sound 
of his voice and enjoys acting it out. She might be learning Jon’s language and uses constant 
quotation as a chance to practice.  
 
1 I would like to thank the participants at the workshop in Uppsala for this volume for helpful feedback on 
an earlier version of this paper, in particular: Marta Abrusan, Daniel Altshuler, Matthias Bauer, David 
Davies, Regine Eckardt, Nils Franzen, Manuel García-Carpintero, Grzegorz Gaszczyk, Hans Kamp, Emar 
Maier, Merel Semeijn, Isidora Stojanovic, Andreas Stokke, and Sandro Zucchi. 
2 See Heal (2001); Clark & Gerrig (1999). Heal describes indirect reports as indexical predicative 
expressions, arguing for a variety of event types, including speech events, that could be picked out with 
an indirect report.  
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A key to understanding metalinguistic practices in fiction is understanding the goals of 
metalinguistic practices outside of fiction. It is imperative that we understand that quotation and 
reporting are used for many storytelling and conversational functions beyond just saying what 
was said. A paradigm use of quotation is in newspaper reports. Chronicling that a speaker said 
something matters if the person being quoted is illustrious — for example, if she is a public 
figure or a person of influence. But other goals are just as interesting, and function as means of 
telling the story itself. In reporting on the aftermath of a mudslide, a reporter might quote a local 
resident describing his distress and fear. The reporter could convey the same content by 
describing the distress and fear of the local residents without a quotation since that is the only 
function that the quotation is performing in the newspaper story. The inclusion of the quoted 
speech by speakers that we otherwise do not care about is meant to develop something like 
authenticity or human concern. Newspaper stories are themselves modeled on the way in which 
human speakers communicate with one another, what human speakers are interested in, and how 
we fill our speech with stories about contexts not present, which require imaginative 
representation.3 We also use quotations, either of ourselves or others, as central storytelling 
props. Authors use quoted speech to set a mood, mark a transition, or elicit emotion. As social 
creatures we are attuned to the speech of others as interpretive devices for understanding the 
story we are telling or being told. I conjecture that the use of quotation simply to convey what is 
said is an atypical use of quotation, despite the extraordinary attention it has received in the 
philosophical literature.  
Fictional works are premised on prescriptions to make-believe at least some of their content 
(Currie 1990; Stock 2011). While traditional works of fiction4 prescribe internal standards of 
coherence and consistency, they invite constrained imagination in the fictional world. Fictional 
quotation is subject to some of the same problems of fictional assertions, truth in fiction, and 
proper names in fiction,5 but also to particular problems having to do with quotation across 
contexts, and quotation used for rhetorical or artistic ends. In telling a fictional story, assertions, 
descriptions, quotations, and other linguistic and literary devices are not used merely to 
chronicle6 a fictional world, but they are each used to tell a story which itself creates the fictional 
world. The devices used in fictional storytelling have as their goal the creation of the fictional 
world which makes possible the telling of some particular story. I argue that fictional quotation 
within a storyworld largely functions in the same way as nonfictional quotation: characters 
interpret quotations as performing their standard functions, and readers assume this as well — as 
long as we recognize that it is characters and not readers who are the audience for most 
 
3 See Dessalles (2007: 25–27) for a view on storytelling and narration as unique aspects of human 
communication and as occupying a broad swath of our communicative lives. 
4 Unless otherwise stated, I am only addressing fictions such as stories, novels, and films that have a 
narrative structure, and adhere to traditional norms of storytelling. That is, I am excluding postmodern 
works, poems, and other representational arts. 
5 See discussions in Currie (1990); Friend (2000); Lewis (1983); Sainsbury (2010); Searle (1975). 
6 Walton (1990) distinguishes between reporting and storytelling narration. He uses this distinction to 
discuss verbal representations in which a character in a fiction speaks or writes in order to report or 
express an attitude, or in order to tell a story. To avoid confusion, I use the term ‘chronicle’ instead of 
‘report’ to make the same point that Walton made. In this paper I use the term ‘reports’ to pick out 
metalinguistic acts and devices. 
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metalinguistic speech in fiction.7 My primary task is to discuss the use of quotation and similar 
reporting devices in fictional contexts, including how they are used to structure narration and 
storytelling, and how they are used to import common ground (Stalnaker 2002). I draw attention 
to some of the features of quotation in fiction that set it apart from quotation outside of fiction. 
Speculatively, I conclude with a discussion of how nonfictional quotation has a storytelling 
structure and the implications for understanding the role of imagination in both. 
 
2. Functions of metalinguistic acts 
 
What makes metalinguistic acts in fiction interesting? Speakers in the real world quote across 
contexts. Fictional speakers quote across contexts within a single fictional world, but sometimes 
they also appear to quote across worlds. This can happen between fictions, and between a 
fictional world and the real one. Interpreting fictional metalinguistic acts sometimes requires 
make-believing that quoted speakers are nearly like real-world counterparts. It also requires 
positing multiple conversational contexts and narrative goals simultaneously. Audiences perform 
these interpretations with literary and rhetorical goals in mind, in addition to goals of 
veridicality.8 Let’s look at some of these cases.  
Here is the most ordinary use of a quotational device in a fictional work:  
(1) “Tut, tut, tut,” said Gerardo. 
A natural reading of (1) is that the author is not quoting Gerardo. The author is using quotation 
marks to depict dialogue in a written form. While this involves the use of quotation marks, it is 
not obviously an instance of quotation itself. I will assume that the narrator is quoting Gerardo 
rather than depicting dialogue, and that the author is quoting the narrator by writing the book.9 
It’s worth asking, even with this most basic example, why dialogue is depicted at all. What are 
the functions of depicting speech (or quoting characters) and why is it that stories are, in part, 
told through the speech of characters? Here is a non-exhaustive list of seven overlapping 
functions that a metalinguistic act performs in a fictional work:  
 
7 This is a problem for Gricean theories of fiction. Much of any given fictional text does not take the 
reader as the immediate audience of the dialogue. See Gerrig (1993) and Walton (1990). This requires 
further clarification: we are meant to interpret characters as the audience for their dialogue with one 
another; the depiction of the dialogue by the narrator has the reader as the intended audience. Other forms 
of metalinguistic devices in fiction (as in example (2)) takes other characters as their primary audience 
when the character is using the metalinguistic device, and the reader is the audience when the narrator is 
taken to be the speaker. Gerrig (1993) characterizes this as a side-participant stance. This division is what 
creates problems for a Gricean model. 
8 There is a growing body of literature on learning from fiction which is relevant here but beyond the 
scope of this paper, although I do discuss related points at the end of this paper (see Gendler (2000); 
García-Carpintero (2016) for helpful discussions). In addition to learning from fiction, audiences are often 
responsive to fictions in ways that would not be predictable on the basis of suspending disbelief. Gerrig 
(1993) provides an extended analysis of a fear of the ocean after watching Jaws. He concludes that this is, 
in part, due to an association with what we already know to be true (i.e., we already know that sharks 
sometimes attack), but the fiction Jaws changes our attitude toward this fact. See also Bauer & Beck (this 
volume) for an interesting discussion of exporting knowledge from fiction.  





(i) It reveals the inner life of characters who are not the narrator. In traditional works of 
fiction, narrative point-of-view is limited, even for omniscient narrators.10 Quotation or 
dialogue can be the most straightforward way of presenting multiple characters’ inner 
lives, thoughts, or perspectives.   
(ii) It reveals the contrast between the inner life of a first-person narrator and his outer 
life (e.g., to depict deception or self-deception). Depicting deception through the use of 
speech can be a more narratively interesting alternative to a mere description of 
deception.  
(iii) It makes explicit interaction between characters. As is the case with (i) and (ii) this is 
not narratively necessary, since character interaction can be described without dialogue or 
quotation, but it is often a more interesting narrative option.  
(iv) It allows for secondary narration on the part of the characters. Below, I describe 
characters who quote prior speech events as secondary narrators.  
(v) It performs a structural role in the story by changing narrative pace, mood, or 
perspective. 
(vi) It allows the author or narrator to accomplish other rhetorical, narrative, or assertoric 
goals, such as expressing nonfictional truth. These are accomplished, in part, through the 
importing of common ground presuppositions.  
(vii) It makes a story compelling as a fiction because we care about the thoughts and 
perspectives of other persons, and these perspectives serve as imaginative and 
interpretive aids.  
 
Functions (i), (ii), and (iii) are interesting in themselves and deserve an independent analysis, but 
I do not undertake that analysis here. Instead, I discuss functions (iv) and (v) in sections 2.1, 2.2, 
and 2.3, and (vi) in some detail in section 3. I return to function (vii) in section 4.   
 
2.1 Secondary narration 
 
In (2), a character quotes a conversation that we are to make-believe occurred prior to the 
quoting event. 
(2)   “I said to her: ‘Honour’s always been honour, and honesty honesty, in Manson Mingott’s 
house, and will be till I’m carried out of it feet first,’” the old woman had stammered into her 
daughter’s ear, in the thick voice of the partly paralysed. “And when she said: ‘But my name, 
Auntie—my name’s Regina Dallas,’ I said: ‘It was Beaufort when he covered you with jewels, 
and it’s got to stay Beaufort now that he’s covered you with shame.’ ” 
The narrator of Edith Wharton’s The Age of Innocence depicts Mrs. Mingott recounting her 
dressing-down of Mrs. Regina (Dallas) Beaufort. The quotations are a prop for the reader to 
imagine this event, which was not previously depicted in the text. This is the first way in which 
fictional quotation differs from nonfictional quotation: the quoted context and the quoting 
context are simultaneously present in the text.  In traditional fictions, we are to make-believe that 
 
10 The point here is that omniscience implies in principle knowledge of everything, but is not committed 




the fictional world exists as a totality, and that the narrator is telling us a story about that fictional 
world. We are not prompted to pretend that the fictional world is coming into existence through 
the telling of the story (even though, in some sense, it is). In this example, the narrator depicts 
Mrs. Mingott’s speech, and Mrs. Mingott depicts the earlier conversation. It is through Mrs. 
Mingott’s account that the reader comes to make-believe that a prior conversation took place. 
Even though quotation in fiction is usually addressed to other characters, and not to the reader, in 
this case it serves the function of telling other characters what was said in a prior speech context 
(its ordinary function), and it serves the function of telling the reader about something that 
happened in the fictional world that is not otherwise depicted by the narrator. This means that the 
character who is quoting a prior speech context is performing secondary narration; or, what we 
might also call embedded narration. I prefer the former label to allow for tiered narration, or 
parallel narration. 
 As secondary-narrators, characters have the same pitfall as primary-narrators: they can be 
unreliable. When Mrs. Mingott recounts what transpired previously, the reader is intended to 
realize that she tells the story with bravado, where she is even more strident than usual, and Mrs. 
Beaufort even more meek. The reader is prompted to imagine that the earlier encounter is not as 
it is described by the secondary-narrator. The reader instead has to create layers of context for 
interpreting her speech: we imagine an earlier speech context between the two characters, and 
dissociate the real speech context from the secondary-narrator’s distortion. The presumptive 
problem is that it is difficult to identify what to attribute to a speaker given how many voices 
there are in a text — an author, implied author, narrator, characters, etc. I don’t think this is a real 
problem for readers, ceteris paribus. Speakers outside of fictional settings use mixed and indirect 
quotation readily, and we are able to distribute perspectives to the various speakers being 
represented.11 
 At this point in the story, the reader presupposes that Mrs. Mingott blusters and distorts. Any 
quotation by her that would otherwise chronicle a prior speech context is discounted on the basis 
of these presuppositions about her reliability. Mrs. Mingott distorts the narration, and that 
distortion serves to tell us more about her character than it does about the prior speech context 
(which is not particularly important for the story). In this particular case, the primary rhetorical 
or artistic function of (2) is to reveal an aspect of Mrs. Mingott’s character, not to chronicle a 
prior speech event. The interpretation of nonfictional speech reports are similarly adjusted based 
on the perceived reliability of the reporter, and what is at stake in accepting the reporter’s 
account. 
 
2.2 Narrative perspective 
 
11 See Gerrig (1993). He puts this point this way, with which I agree: “…I feel confident we could find 
speakers participating in exactly this same range of functions in everyday conversation, both in earnest 
and in pretense… Speakers regularly mingle other voices with their own when they use direct quotation in 
conversation… Hearers must, therefore, be accustomed to apportioning responsibility to different 
originators within the same conversational turn” (112–113). The ceteris paribus point is this: various 
media and speech modalities allow for different kinds of marking between ‘voices’. Speakers can use 
body positioning, gestures, and imitative voices to mark distinct speakers, whereas authors do not have 
these tools. Whether something is possible in a text depends in part on an author’s ability to mimic natural 
speech. Gerrig (1993) develops the concept of a side-participant stance. This is listeners’ ability to 
interpret speech that is not directed at them, whether in fictional or nonfictional contexts. He sees this as 




 Using direct quotation in a story usually functions to say what a character said. In the 
example of the previous section, this can turn the character into a secondary narrator if she is 
chronicling some previously unknown event in the storyworld. Direct quotation — used, for 
example, in the depiction of ordinary dialogue — can present or imitate the perspective12 of a 
speaker who is not the narrator. In an ordinary case, it is obvious whose perspective is being 
taken because the speaker uses first-person pronouns, and some conventions of quotation are 
typically marked.13  
 Another way of shifting narrative perspective is less perspicuous: free indirect discourse 
(FID). FID occurs when a narrator uses language from a character’s perspective as a means of 
presenting or imitating that character’s perspective. For example, if Lisa is the narrator of a story 
and in the telling of the story presents a scene from Jon’s point of view, or with Jon’s epistemic 
or perceptual limitations, or as modulated by Jon’s mood, then this is an ordinary example of 
FID. The language of the narration seems as if it has shifted to Jon’s perspective, but it is freely 
integrated within the language of Lisa’s narration.  
 Some uses of quotation in fiction use perspective shifting that is unlike the obvious case of 
direct quotation, and unlike the use of FID. I am calling these uses free direct discourse (FDD). 
Here are two examples from Jane Austen’s Emma:  
 
(3)  But no sooner was the distress known to Mr. Elton, than it was removed. His gallantry was 
always on the alert. “Might he be trusted with the commission, what infinite pleasure should he 
have in executing it! he could ride to London at any time. It was impossible to say how much he 
should be gratified by being employed on such an errand.” 
“He was too good!—she could not endure the thought!—she would not give him such a 
troublesome office for the world”—brought on the desired repetition of entreaties and 
assurances,—and a very few minutes settled the business. (Austen, Emma, emphasis added)  
 
(4)   “Why will not you write one yourself, Mr. Elton?” said she; “that is the only security for its 
freshness; and nothing could be easier to you.” 
 “Oh, no! he had never written, hardly ever, any thing of the kind in his life. The stupidest 
fellow! He was afraid not even Miss Woodhouse”—he stopt a moment—“or Miss Smith could 
inspire him.” (Austen, Emma, emphasis added)  
 
(3) and (4) look as if they abide by the conventions of direct quotation, and the passages in the 
surrounding text in fact abide by these conventions. Yet, in both of these excerpts, direct and 
indirect reporting conventions are mixed. The pronouns take an indirect form, when they should 
 
12 I am grateful to Andreas Stokke for pointing out the problems with assuming that direct quotation 
merely presents a perspective. I am not sure that I have resolved these problems satisfactorily, but 
adjustments to my argument have been made throughout.  
13 There are many examples of how this can be done. The clearest cases in English writing use quotation 
marks and an indication of who is speaking: ‘Lisa said’. But there are many other options, including 
italics, offset lines, and no punctuation at all — where the dialogue and the identity of the speaker is 
inferred from context. Quotation of characters’ thought can also be marked in some of these ways. These 
variations don’t change the analysis here, although usage patterns within a text inform the correct 
interpretation. See Banfield (1973); Stokke (this volume); Cumming (this volume); Abrusán (this volume) 
for helpful discussions of perspective shift and narrative point-of-view.  
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be in the first- and second-person as direct quotes. What might be occurring here is free 
integration of indirect discourse with the primary narration deploying direct quotation. We can 
call this FDD.   
 One might think that this is FID that has had quotation marks added. The reason that (3) and 
(4) look like instances of FID is because of the perspective shift that takes place, unexpectedly, 
in the dialogue (the surrounding text uses standard conventions for quotation, the marking of 
thoughts, and FID throughout). This may be the correct interpretation. In fact, there are historical 
reasons for thinking this is the case, and that practices of quotation in literary works are not 
historically stable (Johnson 2017).14 FID is a means of presenting or imitating a character’s 
point-of-view within the language of narration. The far more straightforward way doing that with 
speech is to use direct quotation. In passages (3) and (4), neither of these things in happening. 
Direct quotation is being used to present the narrator’s point-of-view. The point-of-view shifts 
from the characters to the narrator; or, possibly, there is a merge between the point-of-view of 
two characters and the narrator in these passages. The reader expects direct discourse to be 
presented from the perspective of the speaker, and this direct discourse is presented from the 
perspective of the narrator. That is what makes it so interesting.  
 The reasons for using metalinguistic devices in these unusual ways involve literary rather 
than linguistic interpretations. I speculate that the storytelling reason for this shift in narrative 
perspective within direct discourse is a matter of heightening narrative pace. At this point in the 
story, Emma has been building the connection between Mr. Elton and Harriet in her 
matchmaking role. The reader gets sense that there is a bit of tedium to this much pomp in the 
matchmaking process, and wants to get on with the story, to increase narrative pace, by 
accelerating the depiction of dialogue and reducing it to its ‘desired repetition of entreaties and 
assurances’. The merge of the speakers and the narrator allows for this acceleration of narrative 
pace. 
 
2.3 Narrative divergence  
 
  There are other ways in which direct discourse can be altered to present perspective shifts 
within a narrative. Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale is framed as a story told from tapes 
recorded by the handmaid and found many years after the collapse of Gilead. The story, as 
narrated by the handmaid, sometimes uses quotation marks to depict dialogue and sometimes 
omits them. This alternation does not correspond to alternations between direct and indirect 
quotations. A plausible interpretation of this is to mark shifts in the reliability of the narrator — 
 
14 I am grateful to Andreas Stokke and Emar Maier for pressing me further on this issue and enjoining me 
to consider Johnson’s (2017) argument about the shifting conventions for quotation in English. Johnson 
also analyzes this form of metalinguistic representation in Jane Austen’s works, and his evidence is 
compelling. I still think that there is an interesting phenomenon to be found in these passages, and one 
that deserves separate categories of analysis, such as FID and FDD. This is because Austen does not 
consistently present FID within quotation marks as we would expect if the correct analysis of (3) and (4) 
is that they are merely FID with a historically particular use of quotation marks. She uses this convention, 
ordinary direct and indirect reports, and ordinary free indirect discourse throughout. She deviates from 
that in some cases, and, in these cases, she moves very quickly through multiple characters’ perspectives 
in FID. The structural goal that these examples illustrate is that she is uses this for the purpose of 
accelerating narrative pace. This is not incompatible with this being an historically particular convention 
of punctuation.  
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some dialogue is marked as having really occurred, and other dialogue is marked as merely 
remembered or as contained in the mind of the narrator. The reader begins by taking the 
handmaid’s narration as an accurate depiction of the storyworld; the break in punctuation 
conventions prompts the reader to remember that this is a story being told within a story, and that 
the narrators can diverge. Just as direct discourse can be presented from the perspective of the 
narrator (in examples (3) and (4) above), it can also be the case that the narrator is unreliable. In 
that case, we expect that the dialogue that is presented is also unreliable. In the next two 
passages, the narrator presents some dialogue as direct quotation of speech, some as private 
thought, and some as what I will call unreliable dialogue. Unreliable dialogue is presented from 
the shifting perspectives of the characters.  
 
(5) a.   “Yes,” I say, “Praise be,” I add as an afterthought. Mayday used to be a distress signal, a 
long time ago, in one of those wars we studied in high school… 
b.   Do you know what it came from? said Luke. Mayday? 
c.   No, I said. It’s a strange word to use for that, isn’t it? 
d.   Newspapers and coffee, in Sunday mornings, before she was born… 
e.   It’s French, he said. From m’aidez. 
f.   Help me.  
(Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale)  
 
Line (5a) is direct discourse in the narrative present, marked by conventional quotation marks. 
This is consistent with other depictions of direct discourse throughout the text. Lines (5b), (5c), 
and (5e) are memories of direct discourse from the narrative past, marked by ‘he said’ and 
similar phrases, but missing conventional quotation marks. Line (5d) is a memory of the context 
of those utterances. Line (5f) is a private thought in the narrative present, absent markings, and 
understood from context. In one short passage, the author distinguishes three different types of 
metalinguistic representations. 
  
(6) a.   Who was the woman who stayed in that room? I said. Before me?  
b.   If I’d asked it differently, if I’d said, Was there a woman who stayed in that room before me? 
I might not have got anywhere. 
c.   Which one? she said… 
d.   So there has been more than one… 
e.   The lively one. I was guessing. The one with freckles. 
f.   You know her? Rita asked, more suspicious than ever. Rita accepted this. She knows there 
must be a grapevine, an underground of sorts.  
g.   She didn’t work out, she said.  
h.   In what way? I asked, trying to sound as neutral as possible. 
i.    But Rita clamped her lips together. I am like a child here, there are some things I must not be 
told.  
j.    What you don’t know won’t hurt you, was all she would say. (Atwood, The Handmaid’s 
Tale) 
 
In passage (6) the author introduces a fourth type of metalinguistic representation. This combines 
direct and indirect discourse from the narrative past and FID. Lines (6a), (6c), (6e), (6g), and 
(6h) are all memories of direct discourse from the narrative past, marked by ‘she said’ and 
similar phrases. Line (6b), (6d), and (6i) are memories of private thoughts of the narrator. Line 
 
 9 
(6f) begins as remembered direct discourse in the narrative past and then uses FID to imitate 
Rita’s perspective. Finally, (6j) represents an indirect report of Rita’s speech from the narrator’s 
point-of-view. Again, the author uses four different metalinguistic devices in a single short 
passage. 
 What is the literary function of the combination of all of these metalinguistic devices? It is 
used to convey the narrator’s unreliability, and that this is an unreliable depiction of dialogue. 
The story of The Handmaid’s Tale embeds the handmaid’s narration within the larger story 
frame which takes place much later. The reader begins by taking the handmaid’s narration as an 
accurate depiction of the storyworld; the variation in metalinguistic devices prompts the reader to 




 The final set of metalinguistic devices that I will discuss are all examples of what I call 
cross-quoting. These are cases when real persons and real utterance contexts are quoted in 
fictions. This happens in a number of ways. For example, (i) a character quotes a real person, (ii) 
a real person becomes a character who speaks within a fiction, and (iii) a narrator or character 
quotes another fiction. These metalinguistic devices serve similar literary ends, which I discuss 
at the end of this section. Let’s begin by looking at examples for (i) and (ii) in (3.1); a puzzling 




 In (7), a fictional character quotes a real person.  
(7)   Mary said, “JFK said, ‘Ask not what your country can do for you’.”  
Readers are to make-believe that a fictional entity, Mary, quotes the real utterance of the real 
person, John F. Kennedy. To be clear, different philosophical issues arise in cases similar to this 
one. One is the problem of using empty names, or saying true things about fictional entities (e.g., 
Frodo, Gregor Samsa). Another is the problem of real entities appearing in fictional contexts 
(e.g., London, Abraham Lincoln).15 In this case, however, the reader is invited to imagine that 
JFK said, “Ask not what your country can do for you,” and this is easy to imagine because he did 
say it, but we are to imagine that he said it in the storyworld of the fiction. This is complicated by 
the fact that artistically, and narratively, imagining that JFK said, “Ask not what your country 
can do for you,” resonates because of what we believe about the real JFK, and the fact that this 
was something that he said. There was a prior speech context in the real world, and it looks like 
it is being quoted. This structures and informs our interpretation; the common ground for 
understanding (7) is our shared set of beliefs and attitudes about JFK and this speech.  




15 See Friend (2011); Maier (2017); Thomasson (1999) for helpful discussions of empty names and Friend 
(2000); Recanati (this volume) on real entities in fictional contexts. 
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(8) a.   Goethe shrugged and said with some pride, “Perhaps our books are immortal, in a certain 
sense. Perhaps.” He paused and then added softly, with great emphasis, “But we aren’t.” 
b.   “Quite the contrary,” Hemingway protested bitterly. “Our books will probably soon stop 
being read. All that will remain of your Faust will be that idiotic opera of Gounod. And maybe 
that line about the eternal feminine pulling us somewhere or other …” 
c.   “Das Ewig Weibliche zieht uns hinan,” recited Goethe. 
 
(9)   Bettina von Arnim: “That fat sausage went crazy and bit me!” 
 
In (8) and (9) real people are characters in a storyworld, and the narrator depicts conversation 
between these characters. With the exception of (8c), these are not quotations from real people, 
as was the case in (7). In (8c), the character Goethe quotes himself.16 (9) is an utterance of the 
character Bettina von Arnim who is based on a real person named Bettina von Arnim. In this 
passage, she is describing her disagreeable interaction with Goethe’s wife. 
 The default model for understanding quotation is that speech occurs in an initial context, c1, 
and it is reported on in some other context, c2. The assumption is that these contexts are 
continuous: c1 occurred before c2 in the same world. (7), (8), and (9) all violate this assumption 
and do not fit into the default model. So how should we understand the cross-quotation of real 
persons in these cases? 
 
3.2 Trans-world quotation 
 
 The first option is what we can call trans-world quotation. Within a fictional world, Mary 
quotes something that John F. Kennedy said in the real world. The way in which this is trans-
world may not be obvious. We could say that the expression type Ask not what your country can 
do for you is an expression type within Mary’s world and within JFK’s world. But the act of 
quotation (in any world) is not merely of an expression type, but it states that some entity also 
tokened the expression type in question; that is, it asserts that p was uttered by someone. So, 
under this interpretation the quotation of Kennedy is trans-world even if the expression being 
quoted is common to both worlds. While it is plausible that this quotation is of an expression 
common to both worlds, and that it implies that Kennedy said this, it is implausible that the 
fictional character, Mary, is talking about something from outside the storyworld. Even if a 
fictional character were to talk about another fictional world (for example, tell the plot of a 
movie within a novel) this is still all happening within a single storyworld. The trans-world 
interpretation of (7) is unintuitive and I will set it aside.  
 
3.3 Single-world quotation and a modified Reality Assumption 
 
 The second option is to reject the idea that Mary’s fictional world is other than JFK’s real 
world: the real world is ‘storified’ within Mary’s world. We assume a principle of minimal 
departure.17 Everything in the real world is assumed to be the case in the fictional world unless 
otherwise stipulated. It follows from this that everything that has been said in the real world can 
 
16 Or quotes Goethe. 
17 See Ryan (1980); Gerrig (1993); Walton (1990); Friend (2017). For an extended and illuminating 
discussion of the Reality Principle, see Franzen (this volume).  
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be quoted in the fictional world as well. This is single-world quotation. A fictional entity can 
quote a speaker from historical reality because the original speech context, the expression type, 
and the quoting act in fictional discourse all exist in the same world. This option comes from a 
view that has been presented and defended in a number of places. Here is one statement of it: 
 
Reality Assumption: “everything that is true or obtains in the real world is storified—that 
is, we are invited to imagine it as part of the storyworld—unless it is excluded by the 
work” (Friend, 2017: 31). 
 
Deploying the Reality Assumption, there are two ways that single-world quotation can be 
understood:  
 
sw1: the device of quotation is a prop that invites the reader to imagine a fictional 
character quoting a real person.  
 
sw2 the device of quotation is a prop that invites the reader to imagine a fictional 
character quoting a fictionalized version of a real person.  
 
According to sw1, a fictional person quotes a real person; in sw2, a fictional person quotes 
another fictional person. Let’s look at this in more detail. sw1 fits within a view of fictional 
discourse that claims that the attitude enjoined by fictional discourse about a real entity is 
directed toward that entity and not toward a make-believe version of it (Friend 2000). Fictional 
discourse that mentions real entities refer to those entities and not to make-believe versions of 
them. Fictional Mary’s metalinguistic act in (7) is about real JFK’s real utterance. 
 According to sw2, a fictional person quotes a near-real person. In example (7), JFK is a 
fictional person, but one who is near-real. The Reality Assumption stipulates that the real world is 
storified in the fictional world, and that includes JFK. This allows us to assume everything that 
we know about the real JFK when interpreting the prior speech context referred to by Mary. But, 
if it is the case that the real world is storified, and JFK is fictionalized, then Mary quotes the 
fictional utterance of a fictional person, but one who has all of the features as the real JFK 
(except for existence), hence near-real. This is a departure from the Reality Assumption and 
requires that it be modified: 
 
Near-Reality Assumption: everything that is true or obtains in the real world is storified 
— that is, we are invited to imagine it as part of the storyworld — unless it is excluded 
by the work. Real entities storified into the storyworld are fictionalized to the extent that 
they perform a causal, agentive, or storytelling role in the work. 
 
sw2 in conjunction with the Near-Reality Assumption has the virtue of containing all of the 
speakers in the same speech context, who can quote one another, and be in conversation with one 
another.18 In principle, sw2 allows JFK and Mary to talk to one another, something not allowed 
 
18 What is missing here is a defense of what counts as the near-real. There must be some set of properties 
that overlap between a real entity and fictional entity in order for that fictional entity to be called ‘near-
real’ rather than ‘pure fiction’. For example, if the character Goethe in my examples were not a writer, but 




by interpretation sw1. This entails that a near-real fiction has at least the qualities of the real 
counterpart, but may have additional qualities as well (e.g., ability to time travel or to talk in the 
afterlife). For these reasons, interpretation sw2 is the better account of how fictional entities 
quote real people. 
 sw2 is particularly helpful in understanding (8) and (9). In imagining a conversation between 
Goethe and Hemingway, the understanding is aided by prior knowledge of real persons. We  
presuppose that the near-real Goethe said at least everything that the real Goethe said. The near-
real Goethe is both fictionalized and an extension of the real person. This is not accidental, but 
essential to the interest the reader takes in his role in the story. It motivates the readers’ interest 
in the dialogue and it allows for the import of common ground presuppositions about the real 
persons who have been fictionalized. We impute to the characters the real properties of Goethe 
and Hemingway in (8), and von Arnim in (9). We take these imputations and then we allow them 
to have agency in the fictional world: Hemingway and Goethe have a conversation in the 
afterlife, which is otherwise impossible. Von Arnim and Goethe’s wife have a fight, which is 
both possible and actually happened. Moreover, all of these characters talk to one another in the 
storyworld and to other, wholly invented characters (which we might call pure fictions in 
contrast with near-real fictions).  
 One final point in defense of sw2: In example (8) Goethe has an entirely fictional 
conversation with Hemingway. In that conversation, it’s reasonable to say that the real Goethe is 
not quoted in (8a), but is quoted in (8c).  sw2 stipulates that this is one and the same entity — a 
fictionalized version of a real person. Otherwise, we are left with the view that the real Goethe is 
quoted in (8c) and the character Goethe speaks in (8a). This leads to a failure of interpretive 




 The final case of cross-quoting that I will discuss is that of quotation across fictional works, 
but a case that appears to involve misquotation. This is to get us toward an answer to the 
question: What are the unique problems posed by misquotation in fictional settings?  
 Tolstoy famously opens Anna Karenina with the line: 
(10)   All happy families resemble one another, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. 
Nabokov opens Ada with the line: 
(11)   “All happy families are more or less dissimilar; all unhappy ones more or less alike,” says a great 
Russian writer in the beginning of a famous novel. 
A first pass at (11) is that Nabokov is pragmatically implicating that what is presupposed in Ada 
is the opposite of whatever was presupposed by Tolstoy in Anna Karenina. He could have done 
this in a variety of ways. The opening line of Ada could have been “All happy families are more 
 
near-real Goethe. Perhaps a model of isomorphic mapping between real persons and similar fictions, such 
as that developed by Bauer & Beck (this volume), would be helpful in building such a theory.  
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or less dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike” with no pretense of quoting Tolstoy. 
But instead he uses the device of quoting Tolstoy.19 Is this correct? Is Nabokov quoting Tolstoy?  
 The first option is to say that, yes, he is attempting to quote Tolstoy but it is the kind of 
misquote that is just a mistake. It is underwhelming to simply assume he made a mistake. He is 
obviously using this form of the quotation deliberately. 
 The second option is to say that, no, he is not quoting Tolstoy. This response is similarly 
underwhelming; it would not be possible for the reader to adequately interpret (11) without 
understanding the reference to (10). This point is easier to see if we consider a more obvious not-
quoting of Tolstoy. Imagine if the opening line of Ada was not (11), but instead was:  
(12)   “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, 
must be in want of a wife,” says a great Russian writer in the beginning of a famous novel. 
Since the reference to a ‘a great Russian writer’ is a reference to Tolstoy, we can clearly say that 
(12) does not quote Tolstoy. (12) is importantly different in structure and content from (11). If 
nothing else, (11) refers to Tolstoy’s line, even if it does not quote it. But, this also falls short as 
an explanation. The opening line of Ada could have been:  
(13)   A great Russian writer at the beginning of a famous novel said something false about 
happy and unhappy families. 
This is a reference to (10), but contains no quotation of it. So, (11) does more than only refer to 
(10), as (13) does. To be clear, (11) refers to (10) by quoting it.  
 The third option is to say that Nabokov is quoting a fictionalized Tolstoy who said something 
similar to what the real Tolstoy said. This would be plausible if (11) were the opening of an 
alternative interpretation of Anna Karenina, one where Tolstoy’s non-fictional assertions are 
storified in a fictionalized Tolstoy, and then inverted; but it is not. But why shouldn’t we think 
that in Ada Nabokov can stipulate that p is true, just by writing it into the story? It is generally 
assumed that the author determines the truth and falsity of claims about the storyworld that they 
construct. Shouldn’t it be the case that Nabokov can construct a storyworld in which Tolstoy 
wrote the passage quoted in (11)? Another way of asking this is: Is it true in Ada that the first 
line of Anna Karenina is that which is quoted in (11)? Zucchi (this volume) considers a similar 
puzzle from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Huck quotes Hamlet’s monologue as:  
 
(14)   “To be or not to be; that is the bare bodkin.”  
 
Zucchi says that it is not the case that, according to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, (14) is 
the first line of Hamlet’s monologue. Instead, we should say that, according to The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, Huck gets the first line of Hamlet’s speech wrong. The reason that this is a 
natural conclusion is because we take Huck to be an unreliable narrator of many things, 
including his own beliefs, values, events, and other matters. We don’t assume that, in this 
storyworld, Hamlet’s monologue has changed. What are the differences in the Ada case? The 
 
19 The pretense is exacerbated with an incorrect citation. Nabokov is well known for embedding puzzles 
and literary allusions in his work. His point in this case may be a criticism of translations. I am not 
engaging in literary analysis here, so I will not try to sort out why he did this. My only interest in this 
section is in understanding the unique problems posed by misquotation in fictional settings. 
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primary difference seems to be that the reader does not have a speaker, like Huck, to whom to 
attribute this quotation from Anna Karenina, even though we want to say that this unreliable 
narrator simply gets the quotation wrong.  
 Perhaps it’s best then to say that Nabokov is not ignoring conventions of quotation, but is 
exploiting them for rhetorical reasons. By way of comparison, the standards for successful 
indirect reporting are typically a preservation of propositional or pragmatic content from the 
reporter’s speech perspective (Wieland 2013; 2015). Successful indirect reporting requires some 
manner of exploitation of the conventions of direct reporting in order to execute this preservation 
of content. Clearly, the quotation in (11) does not preserve the content of (10), although it does 
preserve the structure (re-formulated, and with negations inserted as, perhaps, facetious 
unquotes) (Shan 2010; Maier 2015):  
 
(10) a.   All happy families resemble one another, every unhappy family is unhappy in a unique 
way. 
(11) a.   “All happy families [do not] resemble one another, every unhappy family is unhappy in 
a [non]unique way,” says a great Russian writer in the beginning of a famous novel. 
 
(11) is a prop to invite the reader to recall (10). It is a prop that takes the form of a direct 
quotation, but is being used as a storytelling device, and does not even attempt to adhere to a 
standard semantics of quotation. It does, however, resemble the original utterance in Anna 
Karenina. Wilson (2000) talks about an ‘exploitation of resemblances’ in metarepresentational 
acts. What (11) does is exploit resemblances enough to give the reader a reason to believe that 
Tolstoy’s work is being referred to. In order for this to be successful, a threshold of resemblances 
must be met. Since it is not correctly cited as a quotation from Anna Karenina, it must be 
sufficiently representational of that previous utterance in order for it to be recognized — which it 
is. (12) would not meet that threshold since it lacks any kind of resemblance to (10).   
 Each of the instances of cross-quoting discussed in this section share something in common. 
This is that the use of a quotation from a real person or from another fiction is a means of 
importing common ground presuppositions from that real person and their historical context or 
from that fictional world. To use the language of Maier & Semeijn (this volume), it’s a means of 
introducing a fully-conceived workspace into the fiction. When the novel Immortality introduces 
the characters of Goethe, Hemingway, and von Arnim, it prompts the reader to import a 
workspace of common ground presuppositions about those real persons into the fictional 
storyworld of the novel. When Nabokov purports to quote Tolstoy in the opening of Ada, it 
prompts the reader to import a workspace of common ground presuppositions about Tolstoy 
generally or Anna Karenina particularly. As a narrative tool this is obviously quite powerful. Its 
function is quite different than that of simply introducing a purely fictional character who comes 
with no common ground presuppositions, no emotional valence, no prior beliefs.  
 As a preview of the next section, it might be worth thinking about whether these kinds of 
narrative tools are really invitations to imagine, or whether they are invitations to believe. Many 
fictions, especially literary fictions, have non-fictional goals — the author uses the story to make 
assertions about the nature of love, genius, narcissism, death, etc. Rather than thinking about 
invitations to imagine, we could think about this as an invitation to believe via the imagination. It 
is an interesting empirical question whether readers suspend their disbelief or construct their 
disbelief.20 If it is the latter then they approach the fiction as of a piece with other cognitive 
 
20 Gerrig (1993); Matravers (2010, 2014); cf. García-Carpintero (2016: 7). 
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engagements: taken as true until indicated otherwise. This makes sense within a ‘principle of 
minimal departure’ view of fictional interpretation. We assume that the common ground for 
interpretation is the set of our presuppositions about the real world. When we encounter 
dissonance we revise. This would invert the standard view such that readers are not prompted to 
make-believe as much as they are prompted to believe until they mark those beliefs as fictional. 
 
4. Fiction and nonfiction 
 
“The duty of literature is to fight fiction. It is to find a way into the world as it is.”21 
 
Quotations in fictional works are prescriptions to make-believe that someone in a storyworld 
said something, where that someone is a character or a real person who has been fictionalized. I 
would like to close with some considerations about why a prescription to make-believe that 
someone said something is not unique to fictional quotations and reports. There are structural 
similarities between fictional and nonfictional quotation, and these similarities are used to make 
both fictional and nonfictional reports comprehensible.  
Direct and indirect reports have the structure of a very short story. They require the audience 
to imagine a prior speech context, with a time, place, speaker and other contextually relevant 
information. The use of the report in the reporting context invites the audience to engage in this 
imaginative act in order to satisfy some narrative or communicative goals that the speaker has. 
This is the case in both fictional and nonfictional reporting contexts. To see this, consider how 
nonfictional quotation can prompt the imagination of another speech event even in cases where 
that speech event never occurred: 
(15)   “Suppose you are debating the choice between physical therapy and medication. On one 
hand you might say, ‘I simply don’t have the time to commit to long term physical therapy. I 
want immediate results’.” 
This takes the form of direct quotation, it takes or imitates the perspective of another speaker, 
and indexes the speech to that speaker. However, the quotation is attributed to a speaker who is 
hypothetical. The quotation is non-specific because it does not indicate that a token utterance has 
occurred in the past, but only that one could have occurred. It also does not pick out an utterance 
of any particular speaker, but rather just the generic ‘you’, who might have uttered something. In 
so doing, the speaker invites the audience to make believe that she is in a speech context 
entertaining a choice between physical therapy and medication, and that she is talking through 
her decision process. Here is a variation:  
(16)   “On game nights in my family we always said, ‘we play to win’.” 
This quotation takes a direct form, but, there is no unique prior speech context being picked out. 
There are a few speakers potentially being quoted: members of the speaker’s family. And there is 
some loose specificity of context: game nights in the speaker’s family. But otherwise, the 
quotation is referring to an expression used in a vague context with a vague set of speakers who 
may or may not have said exactly those words. The speaker intends for the audience to imagine a 
 
21 Karl Ove Knausgaard quoted in The New Yorker (2018).  https://www.newyorker.com/culture/the-new-
yorker-interview/karl-ove-knausgaard-the-duty-of-literature-is-to-fight-fiction. Last accessed 2 Oct 2020. 
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prior speech event in which the speaker said these words. This is not deceptive, even if we are to 
assume that there was no unique speech context that occurred. These kinds of quotations are 
meant to convey an attitude toward game night in the speaker’s family, not to abide by semantic 
conventions for direct quotation. The use of quotation to tell a story about game night is a 
narrative device to tell a story about her family because reports of speech resonate. It is also 
similar to what the narrator of The Age of Innocence is doing by having Mrs. Mingott quote her 
conversation with Mrs. Beaufort: it is telling us about an attitude toward a speech event by 
means of telling us that the speech event occurred.  
Fictional and nonfictional reports have this storytelling structure. Speakers use reports to get 
audiences to either recall or imagine a displaced context and something that took place in that 
context. Thus far, I have been discussing the functions of metalinguistic acts in works of fiction, 
with attention to how they permit secondary narration in a work, and how they can meet 
rhetorical, narrative, and assertoric goals by importing common ground presuppositions toward 
other storyworlds, speakers, or real persons. This, too, has something in common with 
nonfictional reports. Speakers sometimes quote the speech of other persons because audiences 
care about the thoughts and perspectives of other persons, even if those persons are unknown to 
them. In the example of the mudslide reporter, there is no reason for a newspaper reader to care 
about what any given person said about the mudslide; the information offered is identical if the 
mudslide reporter merely described the effects of the mudslide. Hearing speech reports of other 
people makes the story both psychologically compelling and easier to understand. I speculate 
that this is the case in most cases of ordinary nonfictional storytelling as well. We quote the 
speech of others largely to make our stories more interesting — in addition to documenting what 
is said.22 When ordinary speakers tell nonfictional stories they are trying to imitate fictional 
storytellers and not court stenographers. Both fictional and nonfictional storytelling uses of 
metalinguistic devices use these devices to import common ground presuppositions. And, while 
they both permit secondary narration, they also both permit the merge of real and near-real 
utterance contexts (as in (8) and (9) above).23 
 
4.1 Imagination and make-believe 
 
Given this, what differentiates fictional and nonfictional metalinguistic acts? It is helpful to 
distinguish between a prescription to imagine and prescription to make-believe with the 
following first-pass principle:  
 
Imagination and the Metalinguistic: imagination as a cognitive act is broader than, 
but contains, make-believe as a cognitive act. Imagination is required for interpreting 
 
22 See Dessalles (2007); Van Hoek (2003) for discussions of how storytelling and prompts to imagine 
other worlds are both unique to human communication and characteristic of our speech. 
23 This merging of real and near-real contexts is asymmetrical in fictional and non-fictional contexts. The 
real world includes all fictional entities as fictions. Real speakers quote fictions regularly (“with great 
power comes great responsibility”). Any given fictional world may or may not include all of the fictional 
entities that are part of the real world, nor all of the real entities that are part of the real world. A fictional 
world may allow for agentive interaction between real and fiction entities or persons, but the real world 
does not (literally) allow for this (i.e., I can quote Spiderman but I cannot have a conversation with 
Spiderman qua fictional entity).  
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all metalinguistic acts. Make-believe, as a special case of imagination, is required for 
interpreting fictional metalinguistic acts because they must be placed in a story  
world. 
  
Quotation in nonfictional works invites the audience to imagine a prior speech context that is not 
present but is real. Quotation in fictional works invites the audience to imagine a speech context 
that is to be placed in a storyworld.24 The nonfictional use of metalinguistic acts prompts an 
audience to imagine a speech context that took place at another time, and perhaps in another 
place and amongst other speakers. Nonfictional reporters can also prescribe the imagining of 
hypothetical contexts (15), or compiled contexts (16), knowing that they are not and will not be 
real. However, this does not mean that these imagined contexts are make-believe. We are not to 
imagine that they are part of a story world distinct from the real world. But, doxastically, these 
imaginings and make-beliefs are not that far apart. They involve the mental construction of 
scenes, contexts, or worlds that are not perceptually or experientially present. They involve an 
exchange between a speaker and an audience in order to make this construction possible.25 
 
4.2 Fact and fiction 
 
If I could end on an even more speculative note, I would say that this may provide support 
for a unified view of our doxastic and attitudinal states toward fiction and nonfiction. The 
existence of cross-over states — daydreaming, fear of the ocean after watching Jaws, forming 
beliefs about the real Abraham Lincoln and his grief after reading Lincoln in the Bardo — are all 
evidence of a tendency to take the same range of attitudes toward fiction and non-fiction. 
Believing facts and disbelieving fictions have to be cultivated in both cases depending on a 
person’s presuppositions, prior experience, and disposition. So, even though our attitudes toward 
fiction and nonfiction stand in close proximity, they are not the same, which is why we can 
construct or suspend disbelief, and can talk ourselves out of believing that which feels true (e.g., 
that a girl can be possessed and spin her head around and around), and talk ourselves into 
believing that which feels false (e.g., the gravitational pull of a black hole can distort time and 
space).  
The problem of integrating fictional and nonfictional narrative26 is central to the problem of 
cross-quoting analyzed in section 3, just as it is central to other kinds of puzzles about fictions, 
such as imaginative resistance. The reader of a fiction performs a great deal of construction 
(which is a kind of imaginative work) in the relevant storification of the real world in the 
storyworld, the removal of that which is incompatible with the storyworld, and the understanding 
that aspects of the real world have agency and are subject to alteration in the storyworld. All of 
this must be integrated with that which is purely fictional in the work. The reader can then 
 
24 The imagination used in producing and interpreting nonfictional metalinguistics acts is belief-about-
the-world-directed; deliberate, occurrent, and social (Walton 1990); recreative (Currie & Ravenscroft 
2002); attitudinal (Van Leeuwen 2013, 2014); instructive (Kind & Kung (2016). The make-believe used 
in producing and interpreting fictional metalinguistic acts is belief-about-the-storyworld-directed; 
deliberate, social (Walton 1990); recreative (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002); constructive (Van Leeuwen 
2013, 2014); transcendent (Kind & Kung 2016). 
25 See Maier (2017) and his respondents for an interesting discussion of the basis of these imaginative 
constructions. 
26 As discussed by Gerrig (1993); Davies (2016); Matravers (2014), and others. 
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extract fictional truths from the work. Finally, from this construction the reader extracts 
nonfictional truths as well. Getting the reader to arrive at this final step is what distinguishes 
better and worse storytelling, and, perhaps, literature from fiction. In the epigram to this section, 
this is what Knausgaard seems to be saying: the purpose of literature is to present non-fictional 
truths about the world as it is to the reader and to get the reader to believe them. It is to get the 
reader to believe via the imagination. If the reader remains in the position of simply 
understanding the fictional narrative as such then the author of a work of literature has failed. In 
all cases — literary and non-literary fictions — an author is successful just in case they are able 
to get the audience to believe what they want them to believe.27 This could be belief about the 
effects of demonic possession on a child, or it could be belief about the disappointments of 
immortality. This is done through pure fictions, near-real entities, description, quotation — by 
whatever means are necessary for the adoption of belief. If I tell you that thieves want to be 
caught, you might resist that belief. If you read Crime and Punishment, you might not resist that 
belief anymore. If there is imaginative resistance to some-such belief, then the author has failed 




In this paper, I have presented an analysis of some of the functions of metalinguistic acts in 
fiction. I have emphasized the way in which metalinguistic acts can be used in fiction for 
storytelling purposes and to further the assertoric, nonfictional goals of an author. I have 
defended a view of fictional quotation as taking place within a single story world, and argued 
that this involves both storifying the real world into the fictional world, but also fictionalizing 
real persons into near-real characters when those characters are quoted in a story world. I argued 
that we use quotation in storytelling largely because representations of the speech, perceptions, 
and attitudes of other persons — most readily represented in language — is compelling, 
structures and informs our interpretations, and allows us to import a common ground for 
understanding. I concluded with a speculation about the way in which reports inside and outside 
of fiction have a storytelling structure and require acts of imagination, but that reports inside of 
fiction require acts of make-believe as well. I further speculated that this unity in imaginative 
acts goes some way toward explaining the similarity in doxastic and attitudinal engagement with 
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